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In Sounders v UK ( 1997) 2 3 EHRR 313, 
the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) decided that Mr Saunders, 
convicted in the first Guinness 
prosecution, was denied a fair trial under 
the European Convention on Human 
Rights, art. 6. This was because the self- 
incriminating answers he was legally 
compelled to give to DTI inspectors were 
used in evidence against him.
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE
The privilege of a witness or accused in 
court, or of a suspect before trial, not to 
have to incriminate themselves is firmly 
rooted in common law: nemo debet 
seipsum accusare. At the time of the 
Guinness investigations, a suspect was 
more protected than now. But even after 
the subsequent erosion by the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 of the 
privilege of silence, the police caution 
still begins: 'You do not have to answer 
...', and the in-court allocutus says '... you 
may give evidence ...' (Practice Direction 
(Crown Court: Defendant's Evidence) [1995] 
2 All ER 499).
REFORMING THE 
STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS
However, Saunders was made to self- 
incriminate by the use of the Companies 
Act 1985, s. 432(2) and 435. This 
abolishes the privilege in the face of DTI 
questioning. There are similar provisions 
in, e.g. the Financial Services, Company 
Directors Disqualification, and 
Insolvency Acts. These procedures, now- 
declared repugnant in Strasbourg, remain 
lawful and unchallengeable in the UK 
until such time as we reform them 
specifically, or the convention becomes 
part of our internal law. This poses a 
number of questions, notably how should 
our law be reformed, how are such 
investigations to be conducted 
meanwhile and how should criminal 
courts treat such extracted evidence?
If the remedy is reform, our legislators 
might take as a model the several statutes 
which half-abolish the privilege. These 
include the Theft Act 1968, s. 31, the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971, s. 9 and the
Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 72. These give 
partial protection in civil cases where 
questions are asked or discovery ordered 
which could self-incriminate. The 
question must be answered and/or the 
order for disclosure must be complied 
with; but the incriminating information 
thus revealed cannot be used in evidence 
against the witness or party if they are 
subsequently prosecuted. The courts 
have extended this approach to cases 
outside these statutes: see, for example, 
A T S^T Istel Ltd v Tulfy [1993] AC 45, a 
civil fraud case, where the House of 
Lords sanctioned a disclosure order with 
a protective clause:
'... no disclosure made in compliance ... 
shall be used as evidence in the prosecution of 
an offence alleged to have been committed by 
the person required to make that disclosure ...' 
(p. 59A)
At first sight, this halfway house 
between total immunity and total 
compellability would seem to point the 
way ahead for law reformers in future 
investigations of the Guinness type. 
Indeed, there is already such legislation 
on offer in the Criminal Justice Act 1987, 
s. 2.
The snag is that it might mean that the 
more a fraudster revealed, the safer he 
would be. The prosecution would then 
be driven to find evidence 'independent' 
(the term used in the Istel case) of his 
statements. This however might be 
purely circumstantial and even consistent 
with an innocent explanation, allowing a 
successful submission; and even if 
sufficient for a prima facie case, the 
accused would have the tactical advantage 
of opening a well-planned defence to the 
jury not previously foreshadowed and 
disarmed by prosecution evidence of his 
statements. But it is difficult to see what 
other compromise, short of restoring the 
privilege entirely, is feasible.
Will defence disclosure now called for 
under the Criminal Procedure (Investigations) 
Act 1996 fill the gap? In exchange for 
disclosure by the prosecution of all its 
relevant material, an accused is supposed 
to give written notice of his defence,
specifying what he disputes in the 
prosecution case, and why. These defence 
statements will presumably be put in by 
the prosecution and any departure from 
them at the trial will bring down on theo
accused the inevitable comments and 
inferences. Even so, this falls far short of 
the compulsive regime of the companies 
(and other) legislation. Moreover it 
presupposes that the authorities have 
enough detailed knowledge of an 
accused's conduct to require him to 
provide answers in the same detail. While 
this will often be true in the more 
witnessable crimes, it is much less likely 
in the typical fraudster's machinations; 
hence the need for compulsion in the 
first place.
TRANSITIONAL CASES AND 
THE FUTURE
One might have thought that in cases
o o
now coming to trial, the courts would 
accept the ECHR verdict of unfairness 
and apply the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 ('PACE 1984'), s. 78:
'... the court may refuse to allow evidence on 
which the prosecution proposes to rely ... if ... 
having regard to all the circumstances, 
including the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained, the admission of the 
evidence would have such an adverse effect on 
the jairness of the proceedings that the court 
ought not to admit it.'
Yet in P\ v Morrissey. R v Staines (The 
Times, 1 May 1997), the Court of Appeal 
upheld the trial judge's decision to admit 
such evidence   not however on its 
merits or on the usual ground of not 
fettering his discretion. The court said 
that to reject such evidence as unfair 
would in effect allow the Convention to 
repeal part of an English statute. Lord 
Bingham LCJ acknowledged that the 
situation was unsatisfactory, that the 
unsuccessful appellant could now follow 
Mr Saunders to Strasbourg and geto o
compensation against the UK, but said 
that our courts are bound by our 
domestic law.
This seems, with respect, to be an 
over-cautious approach. Our law of 
criminal evidence has no rule of absolute
21
admissibility. The Financial Services Act 
1986 ('FSA 1986'), s. 177(6) says only 
that these compulsory statements 'may 
be used in evidence against' their maker. 
Surely this means that the prosecution is 
allowed to tender them and the maker 
knows it. But the overriding duty of the 
court is to ensure a fair trial. This is a 
fundamental common law requirement, 
confirmed by the House of Lords in R v 
Sang [1980] AC 402 and partly restated 
by PACE 1984, s. 78.
However, Lord Bingham interpreted 
FSA 1986, s. 177 as a statutory 
presumption of fairness 'in the absence 
of special features making the admission 
of the answers unfair'. It is a pity that the 
Court of Appeal could not see the ECHR 
decision (wrhich was admittedly not 
binding but surely of considerable 
authority) as such a new special feature, 
or at least allow trial judges the full 
exercise of their common law and PACE 
1984, s. 78 discretions. If it be argued 
that a mere discretion cannot be used to 
disallow evidence made admissible by 
statute, one may point out that s. 78 has 
now several times had to be used to 
prevent the unfair but literal use by 
prosecutors of s. 74 (making convictions 
of other persons admissible, which
necessarily imply the accused's guilt and 
put the burden of disproof on him). See 
also R v O'Connor (1986) 85 Cr App R 
298 and subsequent cases. There is no 
suggestion that this has meant an outright 
repeal of s. 74.
It is true that in R v Seelig [1991] BCC 
569 the Court of Appeal held that DTI 
inspectors were not 'persons charged 
with the duty of investigating offences' 
such as to be required by PACE 1984 to 
comply with its Codes. However, that was 
a Companies Act investigation into 'the 
affairs of a company' and the court 
accepted that it would be a question of 
fact whether an investigation might beo o
regarded as 'investigating offences' within 
PACE. One would have thought thatO
persons suspected of insider dealing were 
clearly being investigated as to an offence. 
Moreover, one of the arguments which 
persuaded the Court of Appeal in Seelig 
was that the then PACE 1984 Code C 
caution told a suspect to remain silent, a 
contradiction of the wrhole point of 
compulsory interrogation. But the 
current Code warns the suspect to tell all, 
or 'it may harm your defence ...' which is 




For the present it seems that the DTI 
inspectors can continue to pressurise 
people, confident that our courts will 
convict and that the Strasbourg court will 
reverse them and compensate fraudsters 
at the expense of UK taxpayers.
It is hard to imagine a more futile and 
self-defeating exercise. One hopes that 
new instructions will be issued by the 
DTI to its inspectors. After all, even if the 
courts cannot intervene, the UK 
government is a signatory of the 
Convention and it should not henceforth 
empower its appointed agents 
deliberately to breach it. If compulsory 
interrogation is the only way of obtaining 
vital evidence of, e.g. funds deposited 
abroad, inspectors should be told to give 
an undertaking that, notwithstanding the 
Acts, the statements themselves will not 
be read at the trial   but used only 
indirectly   to get 'leads' from them. This 
might avoid the strictures of Strasbourg 
while we wait for the Convention to 
become domestic law. ©
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